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Sexual Harassment Cases and the Law of
Evidence: A Proposed Rule
Catherine A. O'Neillt
Introduction
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 eliminates from the jury's con-
sideration during a criminal rape trial evidence of the victim's past
sexual experiences in all but a few narrowly drawn circumstances.'
In enacting Rule 412, Congress' primary purpose was to spare vic-
tims of rape the degrading and unwarranted intrusions into inti-
mate details of their private lives that had formerly been common
practice in the federal courts.2 Congress recognized that evidence
of a rape victim's past sexual experiences is rarely relevant and
even where it is arguably relevant, it is often only marginally pro-
bative, yet highly prejudicial.3 Congress was concerned with two
troubling aspects of sexual history evidence: First, evidence of this
nature tends to suggest a decision on an improper basis and to ob-
scure the subject of inquiry at trial, thereby thwarting the truth-
finding process; second, such evidence harms the victim by permit-
ting unwarranted public intrusions into irrelevant details of her4
private life. Indeed, this evidence is so minimally probative in most
cases that Rule 412 has fared well in the courts, despite initial con-
cerns about potential infringement on Confrontation Clause or
Due Process Clause rights of the accused.'
t B.A. 1987, University of Notre Dame; J.D. Candidate 1990, University of Chicago.
See note 19 for text of Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 412.
124 Cong Rec H 34,913 (Oct 10, 1978).
124 Cong Rec H 34,912 (Oct 10, 1978).
For the sake of simplicity, and because the majority of sexual harassment plaintiffs
are women, the feminine pronoun will be used throughout this comment. See, for example,
U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace: Is It
a Problem? 36 (1981). It should be noted, however, that statistics suggest that 10 to 15
percent of men in the work force complain of homosexual overtures or sexual intimidation
by female superiors. Id at 3.
5 US Const, Amend VI (Confrontation Clause) and V (Due Process Clause). Commen-
tators, too, have for the most part since concluded that FRE 412 and similar rape shield
statutes would survive any constitutional challenge. Even Professors Tanford and Bocchino,
who themselves reach the opposite conclusion, concede: "Almost unanimously, the literature
of the last few years has encouraged these laws and attempted to justify any adverse conse-
quences to the defendant by claiming that the state's interest in protecting rape victims is
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A civil trial for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 raises considerations analogous to those present
in the context of rape.' Admitting evidence of the plaintiff's sexual
history similarly skews the focus of inquiry and intrudes unneces-
sarily into her private life. Although several commentators and
courts have noted these similarities between criminal rape and civil
sexual harassment, the legislature of only one state, California, has
enacted a civil counterpart to its rape shield statute.7 Courts have,
instead, admitted or excluded evidence of the sexual harassment
complainant's prior sexual history on a case-by-case basis. The
consequence of these ad hoc judicial determinations is the admis-
sion of evidence in the civil context that Congress has determined
to be largely inadmissible in the criminal context, despite the fact
that criminal defendants enjoy a relatively greater level of consti-
tutional protection than do civil defendants and would appear to
have a stronger claim to the introduction of such evidence.
Part I of this comment discusses the background, structure
and rationale of Federal Rule of Evidence 412. Part II argues that
the justifications for the enactment of Rule 412 in the context of
rape also exist in the context of sexual harassment claims. Part III
examines the applicability of Rule 412's exceptions to civil cases of
sexual harassment under Title VII and concludes that most excep-
tions are also warranted in a civil analogue to Rule 412; Part III
also proposes an additional exception, one that some have argued
should have been included in Rule 412. Finally, this comment con-
cludes that a Federal Rule of Evidence, parallel to Federal Rule
412, should be enacted and in an Appendix proposes such a model
Rule of Evidence.
sufficiently important to overcome any constitutional objections." J. Alexander Tanford and
Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U Pa L
Rev 544 (1980).
6 "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to ... discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual's ... sex .... Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 703(a), 42 USC § 2000e.
See Cal Evid Code § 783 (West 1988). Section 783, which pertains to civil actions for
"sexual harassment, sexual assault or sexual battery," exactly mirrors § 782, California's
rape shield statute, in limiting the use of evidence of the complainant's prior sexual experi-
ence by establishing procedural requirements for determining its admissibility. Although
§ 783, like § 782, offers comparatively little substantive protection to victims, its enactment
nonetheless is laudable.
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I. EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS AND FEDERAL RULE
OF EVIDENCE 412
A. Background and Structure
The basic supposition of the Federal Rules of Evidence is that
all evidence that is relevant is presumptively admissible.8 Evidence
is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."9
Yet it has long been recognized that, even in our adversarial sys-
tem, all of the information that is potentially relevant cannot pos-
sibly, indeed should not, be considered at trial. Evidentiary rules
have thus been fashioned to constrain the amount and type of in-
formation that jurors ought to consider. Although it is generally
desirable that jurors obtain all evidence relevant to their decision,
countervailing considerations of efficiency, clarity and fairness
weigh in the determination of the admissibility of even relevant
evidence. 10
Character evidence in particular is viewed with skepticism.1
Because of its uncertain reliability and questionable predictive
power, the uses of character evidence have been circumscribed in
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 404 allows its introduction
only in certain exceptional situations. 2 Where such character evi-
' See FRE 402, which states that "[a]U1 relevant evidence is admissible . . . . Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible."
' See FRE 401.
10 See FRE 403, which provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." See also McCormick, Handbook on the Law
of Evidence, § 185 (E. Cleary, 3d ed 1984); 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 1864 (Chadbourn
Rev., 1976). At common law as well the logical relevance of an item offered as evidence did
not guarantee its admissibility. See, for example, Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of
Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to
Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 Vand L Rev 879 (1988).
, See Advisory Committee's Note to FRE 404, quoting the California Law Revision
Commission:
Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. It
tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what happened on the
particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and
punish the bad because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in
the case shows actually happened.
1, See FRE 404 and the accompanying Advisory Committee's Note.
For a summary of the uses of character evidence and its inherent difficulties, see Richard C.
Wydick, Character Evidence: A Guided Tour of the Grotesque Structure, 21 UC Davis L
Rev 123 (1987).
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dence is admissible, Rule 405 prescribes particular modes of proof,
dividing character evidence into three categories: reputation evi-
dence,'3 opinion evidence, and evidence of specific instances of
conduct.' 5 The former two methods of proving character are the
most troubling because of their dubious reliability, and, in general,
their lesser probative worth. The latter method of proving charac-
ter, while of greater probative value, carries with it an increased
risk of prejudicial impact. 6 Character evidence, then, is suspect in
any event. Yet, prior to the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence
412, character evidence of the third type-evidence regarding the
victim's past sexual experience-was traditionally used in rape tri-
als for either or both of two purposes: to call into question the
complainant's credibility, and to facilitate the inference that the
complainant acted in conformity with her character regarding the
issue of consent. 17
Both of these purposes for which evidence is sought to be in-
troduced are illegitimate insofar as they are based upon highly
questionable logical inferences. Yet, both of these uses of character
evidence were routine defense tactics, even under the existing evi-
dentiary rules and their provisions limiting the permissible uses of
character evidence. 8 Federal Rule of Evidence 412 was therefore
enacted to provide a comprehensive guide for admissibility of char-
acter evidence in cases of rape, where additional concerns further
suggest restricted and careful use of such evidence.
Federal Rule of Evidence 4121' provides that, in a criminal
,S See FRE 405(a).
See FRE 405(a).
See FRE 405(b).
16 "Of the three methods of proving character provided by the rule, evidence of specific
instances of conduct is the most convincing." Advisory Committee's Note to FRE 405. Note,
however, that the comment immediately cautions: "At the same time it possesses the great-
est capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to consume time."
"7 For a concise account of the traditional procedural and evidentiary approach taken
under the Federal Rules of Evidence before Rule 412 was enacted, see 124 Cong Rec H
34,912 (Oct 10, 1978) (statement of Representative Mann).
8 Note that it was not impossible, under existing evidentiary rules prior to the enact-
ment of FRE 412, for the court to reach the same result regarding the exclusion of the
sexual history evidence proffered by defense counsel as mandated by FRE 412. This possi-
bility was pointed out during the Congressional hearing on HR 14666, but the reliability of
this mechanism met with some skepticism. See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crimi-
nal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 94th Cong, 2d
Sess 29 (1976) (statement of Judge Sylvia Bacon on Behalf of the American Bar
Association).
" Federal Rule of Evidence 412 provides in pertinent part:
Rule 412. Rape Cases; Relevance of Victim's Past Behavior
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a
[1989:
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trial for rape, reputation or opinion evidence regarding the victim's
prior sexual behavior is not admissible. Furthermore, evidence of
specific instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct is likewise
inadmissible except in three circumstances. Notable among these
exceptions is the allowance of evidence of specific instances of the
victim's past sexual behavior with the accused, where the defend-
ant seeks to introduce this evidence as relevant to the issue of a
defense of consent. Even in circumstances where the exceptions"0
are applicable, however, the evidence must be scrutinized by the
judge in a hearing in chambers to determine whether the evidence
is relevant and, if so, whether its probative value outweighs its po-
tential prejudicial effect. The judge may then issue an order detail-
ing the extent to which any such evidence may be offered and de-
lineating areas of permissible examination or cross-examination of
the victim.
In nearly every circumstance, then, evidence of the victim's
person is accused of rape or assault with intent to commit rape, reputation or
opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such rape or
assault is not admissible.
(b) [Evidence] of a victim's past sexual behavior other than reputation or
opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless such evidence is-
(1) [Constitutionally] required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of-
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by the
accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with respect to the
alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the accused upon
the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior with re-
spect to which rape or assault is alleged.
(c) (1) If the person accused of committing rape or assault with intent to
commit rape intends to offer under subdivision (b) evidence of specific instances
of the alleged victim's past sexual behavior, the accused shall make a written mo-
tion to enter such evidence not later than fifteen days before the date on which
the trial in which such evidence is to be offered is scheduled to begin ....
(2) The motion described in paragraph (1) shall be accompanied by a written
offer of proof. If the court determines that the offer of proof contains evidence
described in subdivision (b), the court shall order a hearing in chambers to deter-
mine if such evidence is admissible ....
(3) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing described in paragraph
(2) that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant and that the
probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, such
evidence shall be admissible in the trial to the extent an order made by the court
specifies evidence which may be offered and areas with respect to which the al-
leged victim may be examined or cross-examined.
(d) For purposes of this rule, the term 'past sexual behavior' means sexual
behavior other than the sexual behavior with respect to which rape or assault with
intent to commit rape is alleged.
20 The other exceptions are provided for under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2)(A). See
text of FRE 412, excerpted in note 19.
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past sexual behavior is deemed presumptively not relevant. Where
evidence of this sort would arguably be relevant, Federal Rule 412
subjects it to the familiar balancing of relevant testimony under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403: probative value versus prejudicial
effect. In a telling departure from Rule 403, however, Rule 412 pro-
vides that in order for relevant evidence to be admissible, the court
must determine that "the probative value of such evidence out-
weighs the danger of unfair prejudice."' 21 Under Rule 403, by com-
parison, evidence may be excluded only when the "probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejuqice. ' 22
The shift in emphasis creates a lower standard for the exclusion of
prejudicial evidence in the case of evidence of past sexual history
and evinces a legislative intent to "give primacy" to the danger of
unfair prejudice.2 3
B. Rationale
The rationale behind Federal Rule of Evidence 412 takes into
account several factors, which together point toward the exclusion
in nearly every situation of evidence of the victim's sexual history.
Sexual history evidence is, in nearly every circumstance, arguably
irrelevant: It neither makes more probable nor less probable, on
logical grounds, the existence of any material fact for which it is
usually offered. Even if it is conceded to be relevant, however, the
slight probative value of such evidence is outweighed by several
considerations. First, and most importantly, admitting such evi-
21 See FRE 412(c)(3).
" See FRE 403 (emphasis added).
11 This difference in emphasis was no mere accident of draftsmanship; rather, it was
well noted during the subcommittee hearing on the bill, HR 14666, that was to become
Federal Rule of Evidence 412. As Roger A. Pauley pointed out regarding an early draft of
the bill, "[tihe standard in the bill would reverse [the presumption applicable under Rule
403] by giving primacy to the danger of unfair prejudices." Hearing Before the Subcommit-
tee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 94th
Cong, 2d Sess 6 (1976) (statement of Roger A. Pauley, Deputy Chief, Legislation and Special
Projects Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
It should be noted that the language of the draft of the bill on which Pauley com-
mented required that in order for evidence to be admitted it must be determined that "the
probative value [of the evidence offered by the accused] substantially outweighs the danger
of unfair prejudice" (emphasis added). Pauley noted that such a drastic departure from the
existing presumption embodied in the standards for relevancy of Rule 403 might be declared
unconstitutional, especially in the criminal context, where it could run afoul of the defend-
ant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause protections. While the final version of the bill
omitted the word "substantially," it retained the basic syntactical structure of the draft
discussed in the hearing, thereby evincing a legislative intent to incorporate at least the
shift in emphasis, if not in magnitude, noted by Pauley in Rule 412.
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dence thwarts the truth-finding process at trial because jurors tend
to overvalue this information or use it to draw impermissible infer-
ences. The inquiry at trial is skewed because the admission of evi-
dence concerning the victim's past sexual behavior shifts the focus
of the trial from the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence
to that of the victim's past sexual experience. Second, where such
evidence is admitted, defense counsel is allowed to intrude unnec-
essarily into intimate details of the victim's private life and then to
air them publicly. The embarrassing courtroom inquiry that com-
monly ensues upon the admission of such evidence, moreover, de-
ters women from reporting incidences of rape and fully prosecuting
rape cases. Finally, permitting evidence of the victim's past sexual
experiences to be routinely admitted as probative either of the vic-
tim's credibility or of the likelihood of consent operates to rein-
force sexist attitudes and thereby preclude the educative function
of law.
Evidence of a victim's sexual history is irrelevant to the issues
upon which it is typically offered by defense counsel at trial. Evi-
dence of an individual's sexual experience or lack thereof is un-
helpful in determining that individual's veracity. Similarly, such
evidence of past, unrelated behavior makes no more likely and no
less likely the existence in any given instance of an individual's
consent to sexual relations. Yet, for these two purposes sexual his-
tory evidence was once routinely thought relevant and admitted, at
least where the individual concerned was a female, prosecuting a
sex offense. The justification for the first use presupposes a logical
connection between chastity and veracity; this presupposition is
seriously flawed and readily refutable. The justification for the sec-
ond use, while similarly fraught with difficulties, is not as obviously
untenable. The requisite connection, however, between an individ-
ual's consent to sexual relations in the past with a particular per-
son, and the likelihood of that individual's indiscriminate consent
to sexual relations in any other context, with an entirely different
person, assumes a fungibility of humans that is absurd.
Regarding the first use of such evidence, it is logically falla-
cious to argue a connection between an individual's past choices
regarding his or her sexual behavior and the claim that that indi-
vidual's testimony under oath is not credible. Chastity is unrelated
to veracity; it is not, as formerly thought, a character trait. Knowl-
edge that a person is or is not chaste provides no logical support
for a judgment upon aspects of that person's character for truth-
2191
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fulness.2' Two comparisons are instructive. First, cases admitting
sexual history evidence for the purpose of impeaching testimony
confine the applicability of the underlying rationale to women.
"Promiscuous" men could not similarly be impeached; virginal
men could not similarly be thought more credible. Second, only in
cases of rape were women subject to this sort of impeachment. Fe-
male prosecuting witnesses alleging other types of crimes, such as
robbery, could never be impeached by evidence of their prior sex-
ual experience. Thus, in the scheme of evidentiary rules, women
prosecuting sex offenses were singled out; evidence was deemed
logically relevant in this context while correctly recognized in every
other to be irrelevant.
It is similarly a questionable proposition that, having con-
sented or not to sexual relations in the past, an individual is more
or less likely to consent under entirely different circumstances in
the future. The typical statutory elements of the criminal offense
of rape are "sexual intercourse (1) 'by force' and (2) 'against the
will' of the woman . . . . '[A]gainst the will' and 'without the con-
sent' generally have been treated as synonymous. 2 5 Rape, by defi-
nition, requires that the sexual relations in question be nonconsen-
sual; consequently, an important defense is that of consent. 6 It is
upon this issue of consent that evidence of the victim's prior sexual
behavior has historically been offered.17 By introducing such evi-
dence, the defense hopes to catalyze the following reaction in the
minds of the jurors: The prosecutrix is a "promiscuous" woman
who, consistent with this "trait," is undoubtedly more likely to
24 For early recognition of the lack of logical relationship between chastity and veracity,
see Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented Again: A Legal Fallacy in Forcible Rape
Cases, 10 Valp U L Rev 127, 146-49 (1976).
2" Sanford H. Kadish, Stephen J. Schulhofer and Monrad G. Paulsen, Criminal Law
and Its Processes: Cases and Materials 382 (Little, Brown and Company, 4th ed 1983).
" See Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 478 (West, 2d ed
1986) ("consent by the woman to sexual intercourse negatives an element of the offense").
27 The sponsors of the bill that eventually became FRE 412 directly repudiated this
outmoded justification for admitting evidence of a victim's prior consensual sexual relations:
There really isn't any logical relationship between consent in a prior instance and
consent in a present instance. This bill takes that position that, except with re-
spect to prior relations between the victim and the defendant, [the] decision on
the part of a woman to have a relationship with one man has nothing to do with
her decision to have a relationship at another time under different circumstances
with a different man.
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary,




have consented to any sexual relations that took place.2"
This argument presupposes a degree of fungibility among
humans that is offensive and rather absurd. The decision to have
intimate relations with another person, every time that decision is
made, is based on myriad factors that are complexly interrelated.
Attempting to sort out these factors in order to reach even a set of
common denominators that would have any predictive power is,
moreover, futile.2 9 People-men-are not interchangeable; yet the
generalizations of inductive reasoning, the cognitive process upon
which a system of evidence depends, require some degree of inter-
changeability.30 Our confidence in the correctness of the statement
resulting from the inductive process is coterminous with this inter-
changeability. Thus, if we unabashedly asserted the fungibility of
all men, evidence of a woman's past consensual conduct with one
man would provide useful information about the probability of her
present consent with another man. We balk, however, at this req-
uisite assertion. Evidence of past consensual sexual relations with
one individual, then, simply fails to suggest meaningful alteration
of the apparent probability of the existence of present consent
with another.
28 While plainly dubious in the context of stranger or violent rape, this inference is less
obviously suspect in the context of acquaintance or marital rape. The exception in FRE
412(b)(2)(B) was incorporated to address this concern.
28 Again, the only situation in which we can undertake this exercise with any degree of
confidence is that in which the parties involved have previously engaged in consensual rela-
tions with each other. Even in this situation, however, a defensible argument can be made
that variables of time and circumstances render improper arguments for present consent
with someone from evidence of past consent with that same person. Nonetheless, FRE
412(b)(2)(B) reflects the increased confidence with which our legal system undertakes such
arguments.
30 The use of inductive proof upon which the law of evidence is based presupposes that
the course of nature continues uniformly. Generally, this presupposition comports with em-
pirical observation, and, although we can conceive of a change in the course of events, the
uniformity in the past occurrence of similar events provides no reason for us to believe that
such a change will occur. Thus we have the confidence to assert about the nature of A that
because A has had relationship R to B's in the past, it is probable that A will have relation-
ship R to a particular B on the occasion in question. In the case of human relationships,
however, our confidence in the probability that this inductive leap is correct diminishes.
This diminution is due not so much to an increase in our ability to conceive of a change in
A's nature but to the recognition that the uniformity of the B's that lends predictive power
is absent. Thus, given our reluctance to assume all men are interchangeable, the assertion
more closely resembles that because A had relationship R to B in the past, it is probable
that A will have relationship R to C on the occasion in question. Clearly, our confidence in
such an assertion as a foundation for our evidentiary rules ought to be greatly undermined.
For an elaboration of the uses and limits of inductive reasoning as it is applied to the
law of evidence, see A. J. Ayer, Hume's Formulation of the Problem of Induction, The
Legacy of Hume, in Probability and Evidence 3-6 (1972).
219]
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Some, however, maintain that sexual history evidence is rele-
vant. 31 Although such evidence may only very weakly suggest an
alteration of the apparent probability of the material proposition
for which it is offered, it is nevertheless relevant in the strict, for-
mal use of that term.32 Thus, the argument goes, such evidence
certainly would survive at least the relatively low hurdle erected by
the Federal Rules of Evidence for the determination of relevancy."3
Even if the relevancy of sexual history evidence is conceded,
however, several countervailing considerations weigh heavily in op-
position to its admission. First, information has often been with-
held from jurors on the grounds that they will overvalue or misuse
the evidence.3 ' Although our adversarial system is premised on the
theory that truth will prevail as the product of vigorous advocacy
on both sides, this does not require the presentation of every shred
of evidence marginally related to the issue in controversy. Rather,
countervailing considerations-both procedural and substan-
tive-often require that some evidence not be presented to the
jury.3 5 Thus, evidence may be excluded for reasons of efficiency. It
" It is interesting to note that those willing to espouse this view publicly, at least to the
extent that the volume of scholarly writing on the subject is indicative, has dwindled signifi-
cantly in the 1980s.
" The common law concept of "legal relevancy," that is, "the requirement ... of some-
thing more than bare logical relevancy," took into account the existence of evidence so weak
that, while technically relevant according to the principles of formal inductive logic, failed
to meet a minimum threshold for purposes of usefulness in the legal system. See Eric D.
Green and Charles R. Nesson, Problems, Cases, and Materials on Evidence 26 (Little,
Brown and Company, 1983).
11 This defensible position finds strength in the permissive language of FRE 401: "Rele-
vant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination .... " (emphasis added).
11 See Patrick B. Devlin, Trial By Jury 114 (1956) ("[t]he first object of the [English]
rules [of evidence] was to prevent the jury from listening to material which it might not
know how to value correctly"); Imwinkelried, 41 Vand L Rev at 895 (cited in note 10):
[Tihe juror ideally should ascribe to an item of evidence only the probative value
that the item deserves. Suppose, however, that the judge believes that, realisti-
cally, the jury is likely to misestimate and overvalue the probative worth of an
item. The judge may fear that the jury will draw a stronger inference than is war-
ranted from the evidence .... [T]he judge properly could consider that danger as
a factor cutting against admissibility.
3' As Professor Tribe observes:
[Elvery rule of evidentiary privilege-from the rule excluding certain marital con-
fidences to the rule preserving the sanctity of the confessional-can at times oper-
ate to exclude possibly probative evidence .... The question is whether the values
served by such exclusion warrant the cost of occasionally truncating a potentially
relevant inquiry. In the case of rape, those values include protecting the dignity of
the victim, encouraging the reporting of violent crime, and minimizing the preju-
dicial impact of material remarkably easy for any juror to misuse. I am per-
suaded that achieving these goals warrants the sacrifice of some potentially rele-
[1989:
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is much more important, however, to withhold evidence where the
danger is not merely that it will require excessive time or resources
for the truth to prevail, but that the truth will not prevail, due to
some tendency of the jurors to misuse the information."6
Sexual history evidence, in particular, presents a great oppor-
tunity for jury misuse. 7 Jurors tend, for example, to harbor no-
tions of a brand of contributory fault of sexual assault victims
based upon knowledge of their prior sexual experience.3 " The dan-
ger of this tendency to the integrity of the outcome at trial can be
conceptualized as an alteration in the standard of proof: Jurors feel
less compunction about mistakenly failing to vindicate a victim's
injury if they know that she was not previously chaste. This knowl-
edge reduces, in their minds, the degree of violation; from this fol-
lows the danger of commensurate but inappropriate liberties with
the level of proof required against the defendant.
The potential for illegitimate use of evidence by the jurors in
the context of a rape trial is great given that "[tihe danger of jury
misuse [stems in part] from the extent to which members of our
society have been conditioned to think in sexually stereotypic
terms." 9 Sexual history evidence is not neutral information;
rather, it is value-laden. Evidence of this nature therefore supports
severe moral judgments. These judgments are impermissibly ren-
dered inasmuch as they bypass or preempt the rational decision-
vant defense material, and in any event I am convinced that Congress could so
determine.
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, 94th Cong, 2d Sess, 54 (1976) (statement of Laurence Tribe) (em-
phasis in the former instance in the original; emphasis in the latter instance added).
" The Advisory Committee's Note to FRE 403 contemplated a continuum of harms to
be weighted accordingly in determining whether or not to exclude relevant evidence. The
risks envisioned ranged "all the way from inducing decision on a purely emotional basis, at
one extreme, to nothing more harmful than merely wasting time, at the other extreme."
" For an empirical study that underscores the potential for jury misuse, see Arnie
Cann, Lawrence G. Calhoun and James W. Selby, Attributing Responsibility to the Victim
of Rape: Influence of Information Regarding Past Sexual Experience, 32 Human Relations
57 (1979).
It has been noted that:
Courts have long been aware of the danger of prejudice based on sexual history,
but in a different way: they have never been as willing to allow similar inquiries
into a male defendant's sexual history, precisely because of the prejudice which
might be occasioned in the mind of the jury.
Susan Estrich, Real Rape 49 (Harvard University Press, 1987). See generally Leon Letwin,
"Unchaste Character," Ideology and the California Rape Evidence Laws, 54 S Cal L Rev
35 (1980).
3 See Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 249-54 (1966).
" Letwin, 54 S Cal L Rev at 58.
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making process. This sort of misuse is problematic precisely be-
cause it does not depend on juror use of this evidence that is incor-
rect on a purely rational level. Consequently, misuse in this way is
not remediable simply by the availability to the jurors of more in-
formation, whether in the form of additional evidence pointing to-
ward contradictory conclusions or jury instructions cautioning
against the overvaluation of the sexual history evidence provided.
It is crucial, therefore, to structure carefully the evidentiary rules
so as to avoid the jurors' consideration of information which has
great potential to influence the outcome in impermissible ways.
A related concern, inasmuch as we are concerned that the
truth will be obscured, is that the wide latitude formerly permitted
the defense counsel in delving into the victim's sexual history ef-
fectively placed the victim on trial. In addition to the obvious
harmful effect this has on the victim, it skews the inquiry, thereby
thwarting the truth-finding process, by shifting the focus of the
trial to questions concerning the victim's sexual experience. 0 The
danger that the jurors will be distracted from the main issue of the
defendant's innocence or guilt is thereby increased."1
Second, one of the primary goals of a rape shield statute is the
elimination of the unnecessary invasion of the victim's privacy and
the consequent public humiliation endured by the victim at trial.2
The legislative history of Federal Rule of Evidence 412 under-
scores this intent: "[T]he principal purpose of this legislation is to
protect rape victims from the degrading and embarrassing disclos-
ure of intimate details about their private lives.""3 Although all tri-
als are invasive to some degree, seldom does the alleged need to
secure evidence justify intrusion into such an intimate sphere.
Where the evidence to be gained from such intrusion is necessary
to the determination of the outcome at trial, the inquiry is more
40 "[Rlape trials become inquisitions into the victim's morality, not trials of the defend-
ant's innocence or guilt." 124 Cong Rec H 34,913 (Oct, 1978). Noting this danger, Judge
Sylvia Bacon, speaking on behalf of the American Bar Association, applauded the antici-
pated effect of HR 14666: "It [will cause] the trial to focus on the immediate facts and [will
minimize] the extraneous issues." Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of
the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 94th Cong, 2d Sess (1976).
" See McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Evidence, § 185 at 439-40 (cited in note
10) (offering, as one of four reasons for excluding otherwise probative evidence, "the
probability that the proof and answering evidence that it provokes may create a side issue
that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues").
42 Many feminists term the degradation suffered by the victim at trial a "second rape."
See generally, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on
the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 94th Cong, 2d Sess (1976).




easily justified. Where, as is most often the case with sexual history
evidence, it is not necessary, there is no justification for delving
into these very personal details. Rape is itself a violent invasion of
a woman's privacy and bodily integrity; evidentiary rules that per-
mit the trial process to turn into a further, state-sanctioned inva-
sion of that woman's privacy are intolerable."
The crime of rape is vastly underreported. According to the
Uniform Crime Reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
90,434 forcible rapes were reported in 1986, a figure that repre-
sented an increase of 58 percent over the preceding decade."' Yet
many experts believe that even this explosive growth in reported
incidences of rape grossly underrepresents the actual number of
occurrences."' The suspected sources of women's reluctance to re-
port rapes are several. Most women recoil from the stigma associ-
ated with being labeled a rape victim; this label is, of course, at-
tached formally and publicly by virtue of her decision to report,
prosecute and try the rapist. More importantly, the predictable hu-
miliation that victims expect to suffer in the course of the ensuing
trial provides a great disincentive for reporting rape."7 Given the
" The use of evidentiary rules to effect the policy of protecting a witness from harass-
ment or unwarranted intrusion into her private life is not unprecedented. FRE 611(a)(3)
requires the court to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to ... protect witnesses from undue harassment or
undue embarrassment."
4' Uniform Crime Reports, Crime in the United States (United States Department of
Justice, 1976 and 1986).
48 This suspicion has recently been reiterated: "Many observers and experts believe the
true rate of rape in the United States is at least twice the official rate and may be as much
as twenty times as high." Margaret T. Gordon and Stephanie Riger, The Female Fear 33
(The Free Press, 1989).
The authors note as an additional matter that even when rapes are reported, police
departments often find insufficient evidence to warrant a charge of rape. This practice of
"unfounding" a rape was reported to occur in "as many as 50 percent of the charges of
forcible rape received." They noted as well that "[u]nfounded rates for other crimes are
generally much lower than those for rape." Id at 34 (citing Crime and Violence, Staff Re-
port Submitted to the President's National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence (1967) and W.G. Skogan and A. Gordon, Detective Division Reporting Practices: A
Review of the Chicago Police Crime Classification Audit, in Crime in Illinois, 1982 166-82
(1983)). Not only do accounts of this practice support the belief that rape statistics are
underrepresentative, but they illuminate one of the possible factors contributing to this sta-
tistical infirmity: Women will not report rapes if they know that they will not be believed by
the police.
17 For an important early article exposing this problem, see Vivian Berger, Man's Trial,
Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum L Rev 1, 4-6 (1977). Berger
cited the "system's perceived hostility to the rape complainant, coupled with the singular
shame and trauma of sexual assault" for the estimate that actual incidences of rape "range
from three and one half to twenty times the reported figure" in the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation's Uniform Crime Reports.
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intrusiveness of the typical rape trial, even those victims who have
reported the rape are understandably reluctant to fully prosecute
the crime.' 8 The social policy of encouraging the reporting and
prosecution of crimes of rape is served by restrictions on the ad-
missibility and, consequently, the discoverability, of evidence of
the victim's sexual history and on the extent to which the victims
may be examined and cross-examined.
Finally, law has an educative role: It is the duty of the law to
overturn outmoded and irrational views, especially ones with the
potential for such pernicious consequences.'" Evidentiary rules are
somewhat constrained in the extent to which they are capable of
performing this educative function, given that they pertain to the
description of past events. Further limitations are, of course,
presented in the criminal context by the right of the defendant to
introduce constitutionally required evidence at trial. Even so con-
fined, however, rules of evidence must be permitted to the extent
possible to serve an educative function in order that societal devel-
opment does not stagnate. Insofar as the rules of evidence are in-
corporated into the solemn event of the trial, at which observers
48 Justice Robert Braucher, dissenting in Commonwealth v Manning (Mass Sup Judi-
cial Court, May 2, 1976), chastised the majority for permitting inquiry into the rape victim's
reputation and chastity, noting: "The 'established law'.., is part of a legal tradition, estab-
lished by men, that the complaining woman in a rape case is fair game for character assassi-
nation in open court. Its logical underpinnings are shaky in the extreme." Citing this ex-
cerpt, Judge Sylvia Bacon observed:
Unfortunately, these logically 'shaky' rules have had a far reaching effect on en-
forcement of the rape laws. Although it is difficult to separate social attitudes,
police practices and rules of evidence, many rape victims refuse prosecution be-
cause of the potential humiliating inquiry into most personal matters .... The
number of occasions on which the United States must dismiss prosecutions be-
cause the witnesses are most reluctant to come forward are numerous .... I daily
observe the terror with which women come to the witness stand and the experi-
ence they have in the courtroom ....
Hearing Before the Subcomm on Criminal Justice of the Comm on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 23, 28 (1976) (statement of Judge Sylvia Bacon on Be-
half of the American Bar Association).
" Feminists have long made the argument that the "solemn respect traditionally dis-
played toward evidence of 'prior unchastity' . . . reinforc[es] attitudes of indifference toward
the dignity, the freedom of choice, and the bodily safety of the victim." Letwin, 54 S Cal L
Rev at 41 (cited in note 37).
It is in some ways unsurprising that such outmoded and harmful societal attitudes per-
sist given that the major treatise on the law of evidence-an area of law that seeks by the
selective presentation of only information specifically calculated to bring about a truthful
result at trial-depicts females, but not males, who are unchaste as "errant," urges the exis-
tence of an "unchaste mentality" that is inherently defective and subject to abnormal in-
stincts, and strongly recommends for every complainant of a sex offense examination by a
qualified physician of the woman's "social history and mental makeup." See 3A J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 924a at 736-37 (Chadbourn Rev., 1970).
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are made to understand that what occurs there has the official
state imprimatur of "truth," rules of evidence have great potential
for shaping public attitudes. Admitting evidence of the victim's
sexual history permits logically fallacious inferences to determine
our legal outcomes, encourages the proliferation of biased stan-
dards in our legal system, and reinforces outmoded and sexist
views in our society.
II. ANALOGOUS CONSIDERATIONS IN CASES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The rationale behind the enactment of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 412 for criminal trials holds true in the context of sexual
harassment trials. The inquiries in which the court engages regard-
ing these two offenses are obviously not identical; yet, the eviden-
tiary considerations one must take into account are analogous. Al-
though some differences exist between the two offenses and
between the respective institutional mechanisms for dealing with
each, the benefits of eliminating such evidence, both for the truth-
finding process and the victim's personal privacy interests, are the
same in sexual harassment trials as they are in rape prosecutions."
One obvious difference between these two offenses, however,
has important constitutional ramifications: Rape is a criminal of-
fense, whereas sexual harassment is a civil offense."' Procedural
guarantees to the defendant are different for these two cases: The
rape defendant is protected by, among other things, the Sixth
Amendment guarantee that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
60 Both courts and commentators have made this general observation. Regarding the
procedural and substantive rules promulgated to protect rape victims from abusive criminal
defense tactics, one court stated: "By carefully examining our experience with rape prosecu-
tions, [the] courts and bar can avoid repeating in this new field of civil sexual harassment
suits the same mistakes that are now being corrected in the rape context." Priest v Rotary,
98 FRD 755, 762, 73 ALR Fed 736 (N D Cal 1983). See generally Linda J. Krieger and Cindi
Fox, Evidentiary Issues in Sexual Harassment Litigation, 1 Berkeley Women's L J 115
(1985).
" Some would argue that this criminal/civil division for rape and sexual harassment is
a somewhat artificial distinction, based on historical development rather than a reasoned
designation. Some feminists, for example, would note that both involve uses of power by
men to subordinate women: In rape the power relied upon is primarily physical; in sexual
harassment the power invoked is that afforded by relative position or situation. Most nota-
bly, Professor MacKinnon has defined sexual harassment as "the unwanted imposition of
sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power." Catharine A. MacK-
innon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 1 (1979). While the similar applicability of
this definition to both rape and sexual harassment is most easily conceived of in the context
of quid pro quo type sexual harassment, it is also possible to apply it to a claim of sexual
harassment brought on a hostile environment theory.
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against him. '5 2 While the civil defendant is not entirely without
rights to a vigorous adversarial trial,58 these have not been inter-
preted to provide a constitutional requirement for the same level
of evidentiary guarantees that the Confrontation Clause provides
in the criminal context.
This civil/criminal distinction is important because the bulk of
scholarly criticism of rape shield statutes is directed at the possi-
bility that they might run afoul of the criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause rights."' Commentators on the
federal statute have been preoccupied for the most part with vent-
ing their skepticism about the constitutionality of Rule 412's exclu-
sion of potentially probative evidence given the criminal nature of
the case.55 Absent arguments founded upon the Sixth Amendment
guarantee, few substantial criticisms can be levelled at the eviden-
tiary provisions of FRE 412."6 Thus this difference between the
two offenses provides a hospitable backdrop for the following argu-
ments supporting the creation of a civil evidentiary provision anal-
ogous to that in place under FRE 412.
6, US Const, Amend VI. The excerpted portion of the Sixth Amendment controls the
scope of the defendant's right to cross-examine a witness who testifies against him, includ-
ing the prosecuting witness.
" See US Const, Amend V (Due Process Clause) and Amend VII.
" For a representative and comprehensive critique on Sixth Amendment grounds, see
Tanford and Bocchino, 128 U Pa L Rev 544 (cited in note 5).
11 The commentators take two general approaches: (1) They concede limitations on the
defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights, acknowledging that where the
probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect it ought not to be
introduced, yet overestimate the probative value of evidence of the prosecutrix' sexual his-
tory, often (unknowingly) employing outmoded notions of the logical relationship between a
woman's past consensual sexual relations and whether she will be more likely, therefore, to
again engage in consensual sexual relations, to the extent that the Sixth Amendment would
nearly always require the admission of such evidence despite its prejudicial effect; or (2)
they foresee that the structure of FRE 412, with its categorical exclusions, enumerated ex-
ceptions and provisions for in 'camera balancing and procedural requirements, would pro-
hibit evidence on occasion that ought to be admitted; this possibility, they argue, is enough
to render FRE 412 unconstitutional.
Note, however, that despite this criticism, FRE 412 and the rape shield statutes of the
states have fared well in the courts.
" Indeed, as the court in Priest v Rotary pointed out:
The courts and Congress have concluded that even in the criminal context, the
use of evidence of a complainant's past sexual behavior is more often harassing
and intimidating than genuinely probative, and the potential for prejudice out-
weighs whatever probative value such evidence may have. Certainly, then, in the
context of civil suits for sexual harassment, and absent extraordinary circum-
stances, inquiry into such areas should not be permitted, either in discovery or at
trial.
98 FRD at 762.
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A. Title VII Sexual Harassment Theories
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
and the Supreme Court currently recognize two types of sexual
harassment claims under Title VII:57 "quid pro quo" and "hostile
environment." Sexual harassment under the quid pro quo theory is
defined as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" when
linked to a grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo." Sexual
harassment under the hostile environment theory is defined as
"unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" where "such con-
duct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating a hostile or offensive
working environment."5 9 The gravamen of a Title VII offense of
sexual harassment, then, whether brought under a quid pro quo
theory or a hostile environment theory, is the "welcomeness" of
the sexual advances.6 0
57 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines on sexual har-
assment expressly recognize as violative of Title VII both economic sexual harassment
("quid pro quo") and harassment occasioned by hostile working environment. 29 CFR
§ 1604.11 (1985). In deciding Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 US 57 (1986), the Su-
preme Court added its recognition of "hostile environment" sexual harassment to its previ-
ous recognition of "quid pro quo" sexual harassment.
8 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985).
59 29 CFR § 1604.11(a)(3); quoted approvingly by the Court in Vinson, 477 US at 65.
For an earlier court-formulated definition, see Bundy v Jackson, 641 F2d 934, 944 (DC Cir
1981).
10 See Vinson, 477 US at 68, citing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Guidelines. In Vinson, the Court found erroneous the District Court's focus on the "volun-
tariness" of Vinson's participation in alleged sexual episodes with her employer and stated
that the "correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged
sexual advances were unwelcome."
The "welcomeness" test has justifiablycome under fire. Harassment is in all other con-
texts under Title VII-and presumably by definition'.-unwelcome. Yet in only the sexual
harassment context is the burden of proof placed on the plaintiff not only to show that the
prohibited conduct occurred, but to demonstrate that she did not welcome such conduct.
The court in Bundy, 641 F2d at 946, noted the unfairness and futility of requiring an em-
ployee to prove that she resisted or did not welcome the harassment, especially where "the
employer demands no response ... other than good-natured tolerance." It has been argued
that sexual harassment is different from racial harassment, to which it is often analogized
for purposes of Title VII analysis, because in the latter situation, racist epithets, for exam-
ple, are always unwelcome, whereas in the former context, there exists a "murky area be-
tween clear coercion and clear mutuality." It is not clear, however, that this difference, if
real, requires the existing standard of proof. Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that, in-
stead, impermissible sexist presumptions underlie the current allocation. Thus, the more
enlightened view would be to presume that sexual advances and other conduct prohibited as
harassment under Title VII are unwelcome in the workplace.
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B. Use of Evidence in Title VII Sexual Harassment Claims
Evidence of the plaintiff's past sexual behavior may be offered
in a Title VII sexual harassment suit brought under either of these
two theories. It is, therefore, important to consider whether the
justifications supporting the rape shield statute in Part I of this
comment similarly support the enactment of a victim shield law,
applicable to both types of sexual harassment claims in the civil
context of Title VII suits. First, it will be useful to examine how a
defendant might seek to employ evidence of a plaintiff's sexual his-
tory in sexual harassment trials. The attempted use of evidence in
cases of quid pro quo sexual harassment more readily permits
analogy to sdch use in cases of rape. The defendant seeks to intro-
duce evidence of the plaintiff's past sexual behavior to demon-
strate that she was a "promiscuous" woman and therefore more
likely to welcome sexual advances in the workplace.
Although the analogy is less obvious, the defense may also at-
tempt to introduce this sort of evidence in claims of sexual harass-
ment brought under a hostile environment theory. Here, the de-
fendant seeks to introduce evidence of the plaintiff's sexual
experience to show that, given her history, she is less likely to have
been offended by the defendant's conduct and its effect on the
work environment, or, if a particular individual is not alleged to be
the cause of the hostile environment, by the general atmosphere at
work.6 Alternately, the defendant might seek to introduce evi-
dence of the plaintiff's lack of sexual experience to demonstrate
that, in light of the plaintiff's virginal or prudish history, she is
more likely to have been oversensitive and unduly offended by
what is actually "harmless" conduct or an unoffensive
environment. 2
1. Relevancy
Whether brought under a quid pro quo theory or a hostile en-
vironment theory, the issues into which the court must inquire in
See, for example, Katz v Dole, 707 F2d 251 (4th Cir 1983) (where defendant offered
evidence at trial that plaintiff had engaged in sexual banter with one of her male co-workers
in an effort to demonstrate that the plaintiff had not really been offended by other employ-
ees' sexually suggestive behavior; the court erefused to find that the latter proposition fol-
lowed from the fact of the plaintiff's participation in sexual banter).
"' For a case in which the defendant attempted to use evidence of the plaintiff's his-
tory, although not sexual history evidence in the traditional sense, similar to that contem-
plated in the example, see Jennings v D.H.L. Airlines, 34 FEP Cases 1423 (BNA) (N D Ill
1984) (where defendant attempted to discover records of the plaintiff's psychotherapist to
demonstrate that the plaintiff's sexual harassment complaint resulted from her own "over-
sensitivity" to sexual conduct).
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cases of sexual harassment are technically distinct from those
brought in cases of rape: For rape the issue is whether the victim
consented, whereas for sexual harassment the issue is whether the
plaintiff welcomed the advances. The concepts of consent and wel-
comeness are in some sense distinguishable, yet they seem to im-
pose similar volitional requirements on the complainant. It is not
obvious that the evidence relevant to the determination of an indi-
vidual's consent on a given occasion is the same as that relevant to
a determination of whether an individual welcomed advances. In
the former case, the court's inquiry is momentary: whether the
complainant consented on this occasion, with this particular indi-
vidual. In the latter case, however, it seems that the court must
look further. "Welcomeness" implies an affirmative act by an indi-
vidual demonstrating a receptiveness to and desire for the conduct
in question. While the inquiry in cases of sexual harassment re-
mains whether the plaintiff welcomed the overtures in question
from this particular individual, the court, in order to determine
whether the plaintiff did in fact welcome the advances, might find
relevant to its inquiry related indicia in the plaintiff's past behav-
ior toward the particular defendant. Although it does not appear
particularly sensible that anyone judge the welcomeness of his ad-
vances on the basis of whether the object of these advances has
welcomed overtures from others in the past, it is quite possible
that this knowledge of past "receptiveness," even to an entirely
different man under different circumstances, enters into his calcu-
lation of how welcome current advances are likely to be.13 Thus,
where the defendant in a sexual harassment case knew of certain
instances of the plaintiff's past consensual conduct with others, it
might have at least been a factor in his determination of whether
his advances were likely to be welcomed."4 Simply that the defend-
The speculative nature of this calculation could of course be greatly reduced for pur-
poses of workplace relations were the law to presume that, in the workplace, sexual ad-
vances are not welcome. Once presumptively unwelcome, the woman would have to demon-
strate affirmatively to the particular individual that his advances are welcome.
Although beyond the scope of this comment, it is noteworthy that at least one recent
case is perhaps moving toward this formulation. In Swentek v USAIR, Inc., 830 F2d 552
(4th Cir 1987), the court found that the trial court had erred in holding that the plaintiff's
"own past conduct and foul language meant that [the defendant's] comments were 'not un-
welcome' even though she told [him] to leave her alone." The Swentek court distinguished
the Supreme Court's holding in Vinson: "Unlike this case, however, the evidence of Vinson's
past conduct bore directly on her contact with the alleged harasser ... [bly contrast, there
was no evidence in this case that [the defendant] knew of Swentek's past conduct." Id at
557.
64 The defendant must actually have had knowledge of the particular instances of the
plaintiff's sexual activity before the alleged advances were made. See, for example, Mitchell
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ant bases his decision upon flawed reasoning, however, does not
indicate that the court ought similarly to indulge itself. The ques-
tion that remains is whether this evidence ought to figure in the
court's determination of whether the plaintiff truly welcomed the
advances involved.
2. Countervailing Considerations
The nature of the inquiry involved in sexual harassment cases,
unlike that of rape cases, might require in a greater number of in-
stances that sexual history evidence be deemed relevant. Again,
however, several considerations favor the exclusion of sexual his-
tory evidence, as in the context of rape, in nearly every circum-
stance. First, the claim that the introduction of evidence of the
past sexual experiences of a rape victim has an adverse impact on
the jurors' perception of that victim should, by this time, be un-
controversial. 5 Jurors tend to overvalue this sort of information,
thereby reaching results by impermissible means. It is logical to
presume that an analogous phenomenon occurs upon the admis-
sion of sexual history evidence in civil trials for sexual harassment.
The jurors' propensity for overvaluation stems from the nature of
the evidence, not from the type of crime or civil action at issue.
Thus, given the same sort of information regarding the sexual his-
tory of the harassment plaintiff, jurors are likely in this context, as
in that of rape, to similarly misuse this evidence and thereby arrive
at illegitimate judgments. The danger of this sort of misuse, again,
ought not to be underestimated. Of all the countervailing consider-
ations permitted to be weighed against the probative value of the
proffered evidence, none is so vital to the correct outcome of the
trial as the consideration of jury overvaluation or misuse of
evidence.
As in the case of rape, it is imperative to the truth-finding pro-
cess that the proper focus of the sexual harassment trial be main-
tained. Introduction of sexual history evidence could hinder the
truth-finding process by confusing the jurors as to which behavior
supposedly evincing welcomeness on the part of the plaintiff was
v Hutchings, 116 FRD 481, 484 (C D Utah 1987) ("Evidence of sexual conduct which is
remote in time or place to plaintiffs' working environment is irrelevant. [The defendant]
cannot possibly use evidence of sexual activity of which he was unaware ... to support his
defense").
" That this is a generally accepted statement is evidenced by the fact that most of the
states and Congress have enacted rape shield statutes in various forms. For a catalogue of
forty-six rape shield statutes according to their general approach and specific provisions, see
Tanford and Bocchino, 128 U Pa L Rev 544 (cited in note 5) (Appendix: Comparative Ta-
bles of Rape Victim Shield Statutes).
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directed toward the defendant in particular and which behavior he
-merely knew of via the office grapevine. The jurors might become
overly concerned with sorting out the plaintiff's past from her pre-
sent, eschewing the real issue of the trial. Admission of sexual his-
tory evidence, then, has the same dangerous potential of improp-
erly shifting the focus of inquiry from the defendant to the
complainant in a sexual harassment trial.
Second, the privacy of a sexual harassment plaintiff will be in-
vaded to the same degree as that of a rape victim if inquiry is per-
mitted into the plaintiff's sexual background. The predictable in-
trusiveness permitted by allowing discovery and admission of
sexual history evidence is arguably even more dangerous in the
context of an ongoing work relationship usually present in Title
VII sexual harassment cases, as compared to the typically momen-
tary relationship present in cases of rape because, as Professor
MacKinnon observes, the forced silence that results signals to the
perpetrator that it is "open season" on anyone who values
privacy. 68
Just as rape is a notoriously underreported crime, so too, inci-
dences of sexual harassment often go unreported. 7 The offense of
11 Professor MacKinnon explains:
[P]art of the power held by perpetrators of sexual harassment is the threat of
making the sexual abuse public knowledge. This functions like blackmail in silenc-
ing the victim and allowing the abuse to continue .... To add to [victims'] burden
the potential of making public their entire personal life, information that has no
relation to the fact or severity of the incidents complained of, is to make the law
of the area implicitly complicit in the blackmail that keeps victims from exercising
their rights and to enhance the impunity of perpetrators. In effect, it means open
season on anyone who does not want her entire intimate life available to public
scrutiny.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 114-15 (Harvard University Press, 1987).
This dilemma facing a potential harassment plaintiff was recognized by the Priest
court:
Without ... protection from the courts, employees whose intimate lives are unjus-
tifiably and offensively intruded upon in the workplace might face the 'Catch-22'
of invoking their statutory remedy only at the risk of enduring further intrusions
into irrelevant details of their personal lives in discovery, and, presumably, in
open court.
Priest, 98 FRD at 761.
" "Research indicates that the problem is quite pervasive. Estimates of the percentage
of women who have encountered sexual harassment in the workplace range from 42% to
90%." David E. Terpstra and Douglas D. Baker, A Hierarchy of Sexual Harassment, 121 J
of Psychology 599 (1987).
The discrepancy between the occurrence of sexual harassment, and the number of inci-
dences reported, either via in-house employee grievance procedures or by legal action under
Title VII, is marked. In one study, conducted in 1987 by the Bureau of National Affairs
(BNA) among members of its Personnel Policies Forum, only 37% of the 156 organizations
represented by the respondents reported that at least one sexual harassment claim had been
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sexual harassment itself, like that of rape, is degrading for the vic-
tim."' It is unsurprising, then, that sexually harassed women do not
seek to prolong or exacerbate the degradation."" As in the case of
rape, this reluctance to bring suit is due, in large part, to the vic-
tim's fear of the ensuing humiliation caused by the unnecessary
scrutiny of details of her private life at trial.10 In Priest v Rotary
for example, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for a protec-
tive order to prohibit discovery by the defendant of evidence of the
plaintiff's sexual history, noting that "the potential of the re-
quested discovery [was] to . . .discourage the plaintiff in her ef-
forts to prosecute her cause. '71 The court made express reference
filed in 1986, and only 17% reported ever having been the subject of legal complaints of
sexual harassment filed by an individual. Sexual Harassment: Employer Policies and
Problems 16, 18 (Bureau of National Affairs, 1987).
"8 As Professor MacKinnon notes:
Women's feelings about their experiences of sexual harassment are a significant
part of its social impact. Like women who are raped, sexually harassed women feel
humiliated, degraded, ashamed, embarrassed, and cheap, as well as angry.
MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women at 47 (cited in note 51).
"o Professor MacKinnon states:
Most victims of sexual harassment, if the incidence data are correct, never file
complaints. Many who are viciously violated are so ashamed to make that viola-
tion public that they submit in silence, although it devastates their self-respect
and often their health, or they leave their job without complaint, although it
threatens their survival and that of their families. If, on top of the cost of making
the violation known, which is painful enough, they know that the entire range of
their sexual experiences, attitudes, preferences, and practices are to be discovera-
ble, few such actions will be brought, no matter how badly the victims are hurt.
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 114 (cited in note 66).
"' See Brief for Respondents in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, No 84-1979, 28-31 (1984). A related, though slightly differ-
ent factor contributing to the under-reporting and under-prosecuting of sexual harassment
is the cavalier treatment that this offense has traditionally received by the legal system.
The law participates in constructing the balance of risks run in reporting. One
reason for a lack of complaints may be the lack of legitimation of these injuries as
injuries which an effective legal prohibition would give. Concretely, when nothing
helpful is known to be done, complaint becomes an integral part of the social pa-
thology of the problem, a further aggravation of the injury of the incident itself,
instead of a potential solution to it. Together with the psychological impact of
sexual harassment upon women's socialized sense of self-worth and the confirma-
tion that a legal nonresponse gives to women's apprehensions about the reactions
of others, it seems reasonable that incidents might not be reported.
MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women at 160 (cited in note 51) (emphasis in
the original).
71 Priest, 98 FRD at 761. The District Court, in granting the plaintiff's motion for a
protective order, pointed out that Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure per-
mits discovery only of information "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence," and noted that evidence regarding the plaintiff's sexual history would be
inadmissible for any of the purposes for which the defendant sought to introduce it. Id at
757. Furthermore, it stated that the plaintiff was entitled to such a protective order where
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to the analogous concern for the vast under-reporting and under-
prosecution of rape, stating that it was "deeply concerned that civil
complaints based on sexual harassment in the workplace will be
similarly inhibited, if discovery tactics such as the one used by de-
fendant herein are allowed to flourish."" Finally, the educative
role of the law is at least as important in the context of sexual
harassment as in the context of rape. Perhaps there is even a
greater need for the rules to fulfill an educative function regarding
sexual harassment, given that many men admittedly do not view
some behavior that the average woman would find offensive to be
"sexual harassment, 73 whereas the type of conduct that consti-
tutes rape seems more obvious. Were evidence of the plaintiff's
sexual history routinely admissible, the message sent to society
would be that this evidence is an accurate indicator of a woman's
desire to invite or welcome any advances. The "open season"
mentality would be discouraged on the other hand, by the recogni-
tion in our legal system of the necessity of mutuality in social rela-
tionships and by its implicit rejection of the notion that because a
woman has previously engaged in consensual relationships she
therefore will welcome indiscriminately advances and harassment
from everyone else.1
the "potential of the requested discovery was to harass intimidate and discourage her in her
efforts to prosecute her cause." Id at 761. This last statement, in the context of sexual har-
assment claims, is similar to an oft-cited rationale for the protection provided by FRE 412:
encouragement of the reporting and prosecution of rape.
7 Id at 762.
78 Note; however, that according to one recent study, earlier research had revealed "sig-
nificant sex differences in the perception of sexual harassment behavior: The percentage of
women defining types of social-sexual behavior as sexual harassment was greater than the
percentage of men who did so." David E. Terpstra and Douglas D. Baker, A Hierarchy of
Sexual Harassment, 121 J of Psychology 599, 601 (1987) (citing Gutek, Nakamura, Gahart,
Handschumacher, and Russell, Sexuality and the Workplace, 1 Basic and Applied Social
Psychology 255 (1980)). Yet the results of the Terpstra and Baker study, seven years later,
found that "[s]urprisingly, the only behavior for which a significant difference was observed
was that involving coarse language .... Significantly more women (25%) than men (12%)
considered coarse language to be sexual harassment." The report went on to hypothesize
that "[tihe current results may reflect recent changes in males' perceptions and awareness of
sexual harassment, resulting from the sharp increase in public attention given the issue."
Terpstra and Baker at 604.
, For recognition of the importance of law's educative role, consider the reaction to the
Court's decision to admit evidence of the plaintiff's "provocative speech and dress" in
Vinson:
That the Court considered this presentation as something other than 'an assassi-
nation of character' designed to create the impression that she was the sort of
woman 'who would have wanted [to be sexually abused]' suggests that the Court
views any expression of sexuality by a woman as an invitation for abuse from men.
The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 100 Harv L Rev 100, 277, 283 (1986), citing Brief of
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C. Necessity for Categorical Exclusion
Critics may urge that, even granting the arguments advanced
above, there is no need to enact a separate evidentiary rule in or-
der to accommodate the considerations marshalled in favor of such
a rule. They might argue, moreover, that a general presumption
exists against such an enactment inasmuch as the law of evidence
focuses upon issues common to all trials and does not anticipate
the development of different evidentiary rules for each substantive
crime or civil cause of action.75 Yet the very fact of Rule 412's exis-
tence within the rubric of the Federal Rules of Evidence under-
mines this argument. It is apparent from this fact that where exi-
gencies unique to a particular substantive cause of action are
sufficiently compelling, the addition of tailored evidentiary provi-
sions to the Federal Rules are acceptable.
Furthermore, the Federal Rules are structured in a manner
that anticipates categorical exclusions. In a departure from the
common law of evidence, the Federal Rules permissively define rel-
evance in Rule 401 and provide broadly for the admissibility of
relevant evidence in Rules 402 and 403, but do so with the inten-
tion that these three basic rules of relevance be read in conjunction
with nine specific exclusionary rules housed in Rules 404 through
412. The categorical exclusions were developed to accommodate
"the frequent recurrence of certain potentially prejudicial
situations.""T
The existence of categorical exclusions arguably represents the
determination that, based on experience in certain circumstances,
the judicial discretion that Rule 403 permits renders it inadequate
for the task of properly deciding admissibility. The attempted in-
troduction of the sexual history evidence that would be excluded
under the proposed rule of evidence is a circumstance justifying
just this sort of determination. Where, as here, experience provides
ample reason to suspect that the wide latitude permitted judges
under Rule 403 consistently presents great potential for the inad-
vertent admission of prejudicial material, the development of an
Respondent at 41, Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, No 84-1979 (emphasis in original).
71 See Tanford and Bocchino, 128 U Pa L Rev at 551 (cited in note 5). The authors
advance this criticism with respect to the enactment of FRE 412. Ironically, they cite Wig-
more for the proposition that the rape victim ought not to be treated, under the rules of
evidence, any differently than the victim in any other criminal case.
7' Eric D. Green and Charles R. Nesson, Problems, Cases, and Materials on Evidence
3, 67 (Little, Brown and Company, 1983).
[1989:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
appropriately narrow categorical exclusion is warranted."
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROPOSED RULE OF EVIDENCE
Parts I and II examined how factors important to the determi-
nation of the admissibility of sexual history evidence in trials for
rape are also present in trials for sexual harassment. This similar-
ity suggests that an evidentiary victim shield rule, similar to FRE
412, is warranted for civil sexual harassment trials. The question
left to be explored is whether the analogy between these two of-
fenses holds in every situation, so that the language of FRE 412
ought to be adopted in its entirety. Particularly, the exceptions to
Rule 412 shall be examined in order to determine their applicabil-
ity in the civil context of a Title VII sexual harassment trial.
The first two exceptions to FRE 412's general prohibition of
sexual history evidence, 412(b)(1) and 412(b)(2)(A), are not prob-
lematic. The first exception is for evidence "constitutionally re-
quired to be admitted." This provision is superfluous.78 It is unnec-
essary given the familiar canon of statutory construction favoring
the interpretation of statutes, if at all possible, so as to render
them constitutional.79 If it is not reasonably possible to construe
the statute to permit the admission of constitutionally required ev-
idence, the mere insertion of a provision such as that found in
412(b)(1) will not save the statute from being declared
unconstitutional.
The second exception, often called the "medical exception,"
permits the introduction of "evidence of past sexual behavior with
persons other than the accused, offered by the accused upon the
issue of whether the accused was or was not, with respect to the
victim, the source of semen or injury."80 This exception, or some
variation thereupon, is incorporated into most states' rape shield
statutes and is rather uncontroversial. Evidence of this nature is
generally not offered on the theories discussed above in Parts I and
II and the considerations necessitating the exclusion of sexual his-
tory evidence, articulated above, are inapplicable here.
" This argument presumes that judges are not immune to the dangers of incorrect as-
sessment of the proper weight to be assigned to sexual history evidence.
"8 For criticism of the drafters of Rule 412 regarding the superfluity of 412(b)(1), see
Michael H. Graham, Evidence and Trial Advocacy Workshop: Relevancy and Exclusion of
Relevant Evidence-The Federal Rape Shield Statute, 18 Crim L Bulletin 513, 522 (1982);
and Rothstein, Evidence Workshop: New Federal Evidence Rule 412 on Sex Victim's Char-
acter, 15 Crim L Bulletin 353, 354 n 3 (1979).
71 See 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 45.11 (Sands, 4th ed 1984).
80 See FRE 412(b)(2)(A).
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While it is typically necessary to guard against attempts to cir-
cumvent the evidentiary rules' categorical exclusions by introduc-
tion under a different guise of the evidence that has been deemed
admissible, this is not the concern here. The need for evidence in
these instances is legitimate; therefore this exception was included
primarily to ensure that FRE 412 was not interpreted too ambi-
tiously. The drafters made clear that medical evidence of this sort,
even though it included reference to past sexual activity, was not
intended to fall within the ambit of Rule 412's general prohibition.
This exception, at least as a precautionary measure, is equally ap-
plicable to the context of sexual harassment. The proposed Rule of
Evidence for civil suits of sexual harassment, therefore, incorpo-
rates a "medical exception" provision, substituting a more explicit
enumeration, adopted by several states, of the instances covered by
the exception.
The third and most important exception to FRE 412's categor-
ical exclusion of sexual history evidence is for "evidence of past
sexual behavior with the accused . ..offered upon the issue of
whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior with
respect to which the rape or assault is alleged." '81 As discussed in
Parts I and II, the argument for the relevance of sexual history in
this situation, both in cases of rape and sexual harassment, is more
compelling than in situations where the evidence sought to be in-
troduced involves prior sexual conduct with an individual other
than the accused. Allowance of sexual history evidence in this situ-
ation reflects the substantially increased confidence with which we
undertake the required inductive leap. Therefore, the proposed
Rule of Evidence for civil suits of sexual harassment incorporates
this important exception, making appropriate alterations in the
language, including the procedural requirements of 412(c) and the
crucial provision in 412(c)(3) for balancing the probative value and
the prejudicial effect of even evidence deemed relevant under
412(b)(2)(B).
A possible exception currently not present in FRE 412 is one
permitting the introduction of "modus operandi" evidence. 82 A po-
tentially important difference between rape and sexual harassment
is the relative incentive to bring false claims in each case.83 The
" See FRE 412(b)(2)(B).
82 Two states' statutes incorporate such an exception to their rape shield statues for
evidence of past false allegations of rape. See 13 Vt Stat Ann § 3255 (Supp 1979); Wis Stat
Ann §§ 971.31 and 972.11 (West Supp 1979-80).
S Note that two states, Vermont and Wisconsin, have found the danger of false allega-
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Title VII sexual harassment plaintiff stands to gain financially"' in
some circumstances"5 whereas the rape victim will receive no pecu-
niary benefit. Furthermore, it seems correct that the social oppro-
brium associated with being a rape victim"6 is greater than that
connected with being the victim of sexual harassment in the work-
place. Perhaps this is because incidences of harassment are so
widespread that the plaintiff will not be singled out and ostracized
to the extent that a rape victim would be. Whether or not this
difference in societal perception of these two harms makes sense, it
could indicate a greater willingness on the part of the feared "vin-
dictive woman 8s7 to bring a false sexual harassment suit than to
tions great enough, even in the context of rape, to include in their respective versions of
rape shield statutes an exception for evidence demonstrating that the victim has previously
filed false rape charges. See Vt Stat Ann, title 13, § 3255 (1977); Wis Stat Ann, § 972.11
(West 1975).
11 This financial gain is often realized in only a limited way, for example, in the form of
reinstatement to a previously held position, given the restricted remedies available under
Title VII. Several commentators have criticized the unavailability under Title VII of puni-
tive damages, and the general inadequacy of the remedies permitted a sexual harassment
plaintiff by Title VII. See, for example, Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work
Environment Under Title VII, 97 Harv L Rev 1449, 1463-66 (1984).
8 Although relative to a rape prosecutrix, the sexual harassment plaintiff may stand a
greater chance to gain financially, it is not at all clear that the potential "gains" are substan-
tial or that the prospect of obtaining them would in any event lead many women to fabri-
cate claims of sexual harassment. Professor MacKinnon surmises:
With sexual harassment 'false reporting is unlikely: women have more to lose than
to gain from it.' Given women's feelings of humiliation and intimidation from the
incident, together with the condescension, ridicule, and reprisals that women who
report sexual harassment suffer ... it seems unlikely that significant numbers of
reports would be fabricated. It is even arguable that most women have more to
lose, on an individual basis, from reporting and pursuing true incidents than from
attempting to ignore them and forget the whole thing. The total cost in terms of
reputation, energy, distress, legal fees, and employment opportunities would seem
to present sufficient disincentives to pure fabrication as to make the risk worth
taking that the legal system would expose prevaricators.
MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women at 97 (cited in note 51). Consider the
possibility, however, left open by Professor MacKinnon, that a woman might fabricate a
sexual harassment claim, not for expected gain "on an individual basis," but to advance a
particular agenda or cause, and the argument that she is more likely under this motivation
to fabricate a charge of sexual harassment than a charge of rape.
" See P.M. Mazelan, Stereotypes and Perceptions of the Victims of Rape, 5 Vic-
timology 121, 129-30 (1982) ("most of the women thought that becoming a rape victim had
changed their own and others' perception of them").
8 The extent to which this fear of false charges of rape by the notorious "vindictive
woman" has historically shaped evidentiary considerations is demonstrated by Professor
Wigmore's assertions in his treatise on evidence. See note 49. As described by Mary Ann
Largen, former National Organization of Women National Rape Task Force Coordinator, in
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 33 (1976), o
[rape laws and literature concerning them have been dominated by fears that
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conjure up a false charge of rape.
Thus this difference between the incentives in place in the
case of rape and the case of sexual harassment, and perhaps even
between the ease with which each charge could be fabricated, sug-
gests the need for an additional exception to a Rule of Evidence in
the sexual harassment context. Moreover, several critics have ob-
jected that one of the shortcomings of FRE 412, even as it applies
to rape, is its failure to provide an exception for evidence showing
a pattern of falsely alleging rape."s Thus the criticism of the ex-
isting FRE 412, combined with the additional arguments for such
an exception in the context of sexual harassment, supports the in-
clusion of an exception for evidence demonstrating a pattern of
falsely bringing sexual harassment suits in the proposed Rule of
Evidence.
CONCLUSION
Several important considerations prompted Congress to enact
Federal Rule of Evidence 412, prescribing guidelines for the admis-
sibility of evidence of the rape victim's prior sexual experience.
The most important reason was to avoid thwarting the truth-find-
ing process by permitting the jurors to hear information likely to
be overvalued and to skew the focus of the inquiry. Another pri-
mary goal of the Rule was to eliminate unnecessary intrusion into
the private affairs of the victim. Additional policy considerations
bolstered the argument for enacting Rule 412, including the need
to encourage reporting and prosecution of rapes, and the duty of
the law to discourage logically insupportable and sexist views in
society.
Considerations similar to those necessitating the enactment of
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 are present in the context of a civil
false rape charges might result in the conviction of innocent men. Underlying this
fear is the basic assumption that women can induce rape convictions solely by
virtue of fabricated reports. Though such assumptions have remained consistently
undocumented or analyzed, nevertheless they have produced and sustained laws
and attitudes overly protective of the defendant and overly invasive of the privacy
of the victim .... Wigmore, for example, strongly asserts that men are often
falsely convicted of rape .... Despite the lack of evidentiary support for his con-
clusions, Wigmore is often quoted to substantiate the contention that fabricated
stories may lead to convictions in rape cases.
88 See, for example, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 64-65 (1976) (state-
ment of Dovey Roundtree on Behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union); and Paul F.
Rothstein, Evidence Workshop: New Federal Evidence Rule 412 on Sex Victim's Charac-
ter, 15 Crim L Bulletin 353, 362 (1979).
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trial for sexual harassment. Yet under the existing scheme of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, sexual harassment plaintiffs are de-
prived of the tailored evidentiary protections afforded the rape
complainant. Instead, they are at the mercy of judicial discretion
and the interplay of Rules of Evidence inadequate for the task.
The determination of the admissibility of evidence of the sexual
history of a plaintiff in a Title VII sexual harassment claim ought
not to be left to ad hoc judicial evaluation. Because judges may
unknowingly harbor the same outmoded attitudes that pervade so-
ciety, legislative guidance is necessary. Thus, the proposed Federal
Rule of Evidence governing the standards for admissibility of evi-
dence of a plaintiffs prior sexual experience in Title VII sexual
harassment claims should be enacted.
APPENDIX
Model Rule of Evidence
Sexual Harassment Cases; Relevance of Victim's Past
Behavior
(a) In a civil action in which a person is charged with sexual
harassment, reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual be-
havior of the victim of such sexual harassment is not admissible.
(b) In a civil action in which a person is charged with sexual
harassment, evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior other than
reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless such
evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is-
(1) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evi-
dence of-
(A) past sexual behavior with the defendant and is offered by
the defendant upon the issue of whether the plaintiff welcomed
defendant's sexual advances; or
(B) past sexual behavior which formed the basis of a prior
false charge of sexual harassment, offered by the defendant upon
the issue of the plaintiff's credibility in bringing the instant action;
or
(C) past sexual behavior with persons other than the defend-
ant, offered by the defendant upon the issue of whether the de-
fendant was or was not, with respect to the plaintiff, the source of
semen, pregnancy, disease or injury.
(c) Procedures for Admission
(1) If the person charged with sexual harassment intends to
offer under subdivision (b) evidence of specific instances of the
plaintiff's past sexual behavior, the defendant shall make a written
motion to offer such evidence not later than fifteen days before the
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date on which the trial in which such evidence is to be offered is
scheduled to begin, except that the court may allow the motion to
be made at a later date, including during trial, if the court deter-
mines either that the evidence is newly discovered and could not
have been obtained earlier through the exercise of due diligence or
that the issue to which such evidence relates had newly arisen in
the case. Any motion made under this paragraph shall be served on
all other parties and on the plaintiff.
(2) The motion described in paragraph (1) shall be accompa-
nied by a written offer of proof. If the court determines that the
offer of proof contains evidence described in subdivision (b), the
court shall order an in camera hearing to determine if such evi-
dence is admissible. At such hearing the parties may call witnesses,
including the alleged victim, and offer relevant evidence. Notwith-
standing subdivision (b) of Rule 104, if the relevancy of the evi-
dence which the defendant seeks to offer in the trial depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court, at the in camera
hearing or at a subsequent in camera hearing scheduled for such
purpose, shall accept evidence on the issue of whether such condi-
tion of fact is fulfilled and shall determine each issue.
(3) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing de-
scribed in paragraph (2) that the evidence which the defendant
seeks to offer is relevant and that the probative value of such evi-
dence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence shall
be admissible in trial to the extent an order made by the court
specifies evidence which may be offered and areas with respect to
which the plaintiff may be examined or cross-examined.
(d) For purposes of this rule, the term 'past sexual behavior'
means sexual behavior other than sexual behavior with respect to
which sexual harassment is charged.
Comment to Proposed Rule of Evidence
It is intended that this Rule will serve as a model for the
States.
The exception found in Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b)(1),
for any evidence that "is constitutionally required to be admitted,"
is omitted because it is superfluous. For criticism of the drafters of
Rule 412 in this regard, see Michael H. Graham, Evidence and
Trial Advocacy Workshop: Relevancy and Exclusion of Relevant
Evidence-The Federal Rape Shield Statute, 18 Crim L Bulletin
513, 522 (1982); and Paul F. Rothstein, Evidence Workshop: New
Federal Evidence Rule 412 on Sex Victim's Character, 15 Crim L
Bulletin 353, 354 n 3 (1979). The Rule, therefore, in subsection (b)
endeavors to enumerate those situations in which exceptions might
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be required, whether for constitutional or other policy
considerations.
The Rule recognizes that there may be instances where co-
workers develop various types of social relationships, against which
backdrop of mutuality sexual advances may be presumed by those
individuals involved to be welcome. Thus, (b)(1)(A) provides an
exception for evidence of the plaintiff's past sexual behavior with
the defendant in cases where the welcomeness of his sexual ad-
vances is in issue.
The Rule recognizes the concern that in some circumstances,
however rare, a plaintiff may bring repeated, unfounded suits for
sexual harassment. Akin to instances calling for admission of evi-
dence to demonstrate a type of "modus operandi," the defendant
may wish to show that the particular charge of sexual harassment
at bar is but one in a series of actions brought by the plaintiff
under similar circumstances. This concern has been articulated by
several critics of Rule 412 as one of its shortcomings. See, for ex-
ample, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of
the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 94th
Cong, 2d Sess 64-65 (1976) (statement of Dovey Roundtree on Be-
half of the American Civil Liberties Union); Rothstein, 15 Crim L
Bulletin at 360-62. Note that Rothstein's proposed alternative stat-
ute to Rule 412 would include an exception for evidence of specific
instances of sexual conduct that "is part of a definite pattern of
conduct which, in the circumstances of the case, is substantially
probative of consent," and that the suggested statute "is not con-
fined to cases of rape and assault with intent to commit rape" but
applies to "sex offenses." Rothstein is, however, unclear as to
whether "sex offense" includes sexual harassment. Provision
(b)(1)(B) anticipates this objection and allows an exception for
such evidence where the plaintiff's past sexual behavior has formed
the basis for prior false charges of sexual harassment in similar cir-
cumstances. Because modus operandi evidence refers to a particu-
larized and repetitive kind of conduct, it is therefore likely to be a
more reliable predictor of subsequent conduct than character evi-
dence in general. Moreover, modus operandi evidence is not
couched in the rhetoric of moral judgment and is thus less likely to
invite jurors to form their decisions on illegitimate bases. For com-
ments on the modus operandi exception to rape shield statutes, see
Leo Letwin, "Unchaste Character," Ideology, and the California
Rape Evidence Laws, 54 S Cal L Rev 35, 74-75 (1980). Note that
some states have already incorporated similar exceptions to their
rape shield statutes for the alleged victim who has a history of
219]
250 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
falsely reporting sexual assault. See, for example, 1976 Colo Rev
Stat § 18-3-407.
Finally, it bears emphasis that evidence offered under any of
the possible exceptions, enumerated under subsection (b), is not
automatically admissible, but must conform to the procedural re-
quirements and undergo the balancing determination by the court
provided for in subsection (c). Thus a double safeguard is envi-
sioned: it is anticipated that the traditional judicial evidentiary
balancing coupled with legislative guidance for evidence of a par-
ticular nature will best effect the goals of this Rule. Moreover, the
protections afforded by the requirement of a hearing would be un-
dermined if that hearing or the record thereof were to be made
public; therefore, it is intended that the proceedings be in camera
and off the record, or that the record be sealed, and that the public
and the press be denied access to these proceedings. Regarding the
concern that the extent of these protective measures was not made
clear either by the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 412 or by
its legislative history, see Rothstein, Evidence Workshop: New
Federal Evidence Rule 412 on Sex Victim's Character, 15 Crim L
Bull at 355 and n 5. Finally, it is anticipated that defense counsel
will not be able to delve into the plaintiff's sexual history under
the guise of discovery. Discovery of evidence to be used at trial will
of course be limited according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b). Furthermore, it is intended that defense counsel will not be
permitted to avail themselves of broad discovery of the plaintiff's
private life even when the evidence sought is to be presented dur-
ing the in camera hearings. As Professor Tribe noted in discussing
Rule 412's protective limitations on discovery, "most of the consid-
erations counseling against the allowance of such assaults upon the
victim in open court likewise argue against its allowance even in
camera." Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of
the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 94th
Cong, 2d Sess 55 (1976).
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